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Abstract: Soeharto used the Indonesian bureaucracy to generate
rents that could be harvested by ‘insider’ firms, while also encour-
aging it to extort money from ‘outsider’ firms and individuals. This
necessitated incentives that would ensure strong loyalty and mini-
mize internal opposition. Government entities were provided with
insufficient budget funding to cover their costs, and their officials
were expected to generate cash from illegal activities, making pub-
lic sector employees financially dependent on corruption. Any
employee who opposed this system could expect to be restricted to
earning no more than the pitifully low formal salary entitlement.
The system therefore became strongly self-reinforcing.
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Some 10 years after former President Soeharto resigned from office,
Indonesia has made impressive progress in relation to reform of its
political system, but very little in relation to bureaucratic reform. The
latter was perhaps the key promise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)
during his successful campaign for the presidency in 2004. Failure to
deliver on this promise has been a major source of disappointment on
the part of the general public,1 who had eagerly embraced the opportu-
nity to elect their president directly for the first time (by virtue of a
2001 constitutional amendment).2 This is not to suggest that SBY has
made no effort to improve the functioning of the bureaucracy. Rather,
1 According to a survey undertaken in May 2008, 59% of respondents were either
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the progress of reform during the post-Soeharto
era, as against 31% who were sufficiently or very satisfied (Lingkaran Survei Indo-
nesia, 2008).
2 Previously, presidents had been elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly.
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the problem is that efforts to date have been misdirected. The focus has
been almost exclusively on fighting corruption, but although there have
been numerous prosecutions of quite high-level officials, plus some
disruption of previous patterns of corrupt behaviour, there is little to
suggest any significant reduction in its overall level. Indeed, the devo-
lution of many of the powers of government to local level – itself a
component of the post-Soeharto reforms – appears to have resulted in a
proliferation of corruption, making life even more uncertain for the
business community, on which Indonesia’s economic progress heavily
depends.
I shall argue here that corruption is only a symptom of a fundamental
problem of inappropriate personnel management practices in the bu-
reaucracy, and that these are a part of the Soeharto legacy, having been
designed for a bureaucracy that was intended to be corrupt. The system
of incentives facing civil servants was not designed to achieve effec-
tiveness in terms of pursuing the interests of the general public, but to
encourage loyalty to the regime; the consequence of this is that post-
Soeharto presidents have been hobbled by a bureaucracy that performs
well below the level of competence that would be possible with a bet-
ter designed system. Low bureaucratic effectiveness has significant
implications for economic growth, since the private sector depends on
the bureaucracy to provide complementary inputs such as physical and
legal infrastructure.
The Soeharto franchise
To gain a clear understanding of how the Soeharto regime functioned,
it is essential first to set aside the idealized notion of government in the
public interest. Thus I argue here that Indonesia’s former president
moulded the five major components of the public sector into a ‘fran-
chise’ system (Figure 1), the fundamental purpose of which was to use
the coercive power of government privately to tax the general public
and redistribute the tax revenue to a small elite. Government was not
‘of the people, by the people and for the people’, but rather ‘of the
people, by and for the controlling elite’.
The first branch of the franchise encompassed the legislature and the
political parties. There were only three parties, one of which was
Soeharto’s election vehicle, Golkar. The other two were tame parties
that had been formed by forced amalgamations of a greater number of
parties that had existed in years gone by. The second branch of the
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Figure 1. Soeharto’s franchise system.
franchise comprised the bureaucracy – that is, all of the government
departments, plus a number of non-department agencies (such as the
logistics agency, Bulog, and the central bank, Bank Indonesia). The
third element – technically part of the bureaucracy, but worth consid-
ering as a distinct component in its own right – was the judiciary and
the associated legal bureaucracy, such as the Attorney General’s office
and the Department of Justice. Fourth was the military, which, under
Soeharto, also included the police.3 Finally, we come to the numerous
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which were previously owned
by the Dutch, but were nationalized in the 1950s; these were spread
over a wide range of sectors of the economy, such as banking and fi-
nance, natural resources, transportation, retailing, plantation agriculture
and so on.
The core activity of this giant franchise was located in the bureauc-
racy and, to a lesser extent, the state enterprises. One of the two key
functions of the bureaucracy was to implement policies that would gen-
erate rents on behalf of the beneficiaries of the franchise system. These
‘insider’ beneficiary firms included the so-called ‘conglomerates’ (that
is, large, diversified business groups owned by cronies of the presi-
dent, most of which were owned by ethnic Chinese); a number of large
foreign firms permitted to operate in Indonesia, almost always in part-
nership with some local entity favoured by the regime; companies owned
3 In recent years, the police force has been separated from the armed forces.
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by the first family (that is, relatives of the president himself);4 and
companies owned by franchisees (numerous officials at various levels
within the public sector institutions) and their families. Rents could be
generated in countless ways by the bureaucracy for each of these ben-
eficiary groups. A simple example from the early days of the regime
was the granting of exclusive rights to import cloves – the all-impor-
tant special ingredient in Indonesia’s famous clove cigarettes, or kretek
– to just two firms, one owned by the president’s half-brother,
Probosutedjo, the other by one of his closest cronies, Liem Sioe Liong.
Another type of monopoly was that enjoyed by individuals – often
serving or retired military officials – designated as concessionaires with
the sole right to undertake logging in large parts of Indonesia’s vast
rainforests.5
Monopolies and concessions of one kind or another were just two of
the means by which the beneficiaries of the franchise could be virtu-
ally guaranteed to earn very high profits, which were then to be shared
with Soeharto and his family members, and with highly placed mem-
bers of the franchise.6 The state-owned enterprises were also used as a
means of enriching the beneficiaries of the franchise system, most ob-
viously the conglomerates and first-family companies. Firms in these
groups engaged in business transactions with SOEs at artificially
determined prices favourable to themselves. Loans from state banks
carried below-market interest rates, and quite often had the enormous
added benefit of not having to be repaid. Fuel could be purchased at
below-market prices from the giant state oil company, Pertamina. Air-
port space and facilities could be rented from state-owned airport
operators at below-market rates, again with the added bonus of per-
haps indefinitely delayed payment.
The same kind of symbiotic relationship as that which existed between
the president and big business was replicated on a smaller scale at min-
isterial level and below, as well as in regional governments throughout
4 This group became increasingly important and significant in the economy as Soeharto’s
children grew to become adults and began to establish businesses of their own, rather
than in partnership with their father’s cronies.
5 These were monopolists in the sense that they were simply awarded concessions by
government fiat, rather than needing to bid in competition with other firms for the
right to log the concession areas.
6 Two important techniques for rent sharing were donations by the insider firms to a
number of non-transparent and non-taxable foundations controlled by the regime,
and the issue of shares in these firms, free of charge, to family members of the franchisor
and franchisees.
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the country. Provincial governors, mayors and heads of districts,
subdistricts and even villages, along with their bureaucrats and admin-
istrators, were encouraged – indeed, expected – to act in similar manner.
When opportunities existed for government officials at any level to use
their authority in ways that generated excess profits for favoured busi-
nesses, this was precisely what occurred. Obvious examples include
awarding overpriced contracts for the construction of public works,
government buildings and so on, or for the supply of equipment and
materials to government offices, schools and healthcare facilities, and
even for catering for official gatherings of one kind or another. Enter-
prises and banks owned by lower-level governments were also used to
generate excess profits for favoured private sector businesses.
While insider firms harvested the rents generated for them by the
bureaucracy, other ‘outsider’ private sector firms and individuals served
instead as targets for predation. Franchisees within the bureaucracy
and the military/police were expected by Soeharto to generate addi-
tional income via extortion from these firms and individuals, including
smaller foreign firms, and to share the proceeds with him. Bureaucratic
extortion usually took the form of requiring bribes as a condition for
the issue of licences, the delivery of normal public services, and so on,
while extortion of a more overtly criminal nature, involving the use or
threat of violence, was undertaken by the military,7 often working through
private sector subcontractors – thugs and criminal gangs known as
preman. The military also generated large amounts of income through
involvement in victimless crime – gambling, prostitution and drug traf-
ficking – and through illegal exploitation of the nation’s natural resources,
such as forests, minerals and fisheries (Rieffel and Pramodharwardani,
2007).
The relationship between the public sector and outsiders was para-
sitic, while that between the public sector and insiders was symbiotic.
But in both cases it was the general public that ended up paying the
tax. The prices of products it purchased from the insider firms were
artificially high. The prices of goods and services purchased on its be-
half by the government were artificially high; and the prices of goods
and services sold to insider firms by state enterprises were artificially
low. The payments made by individuals in response to bureaucratic
7 Soeharto himself had previously been involved in such activity, and ‘was dismissed
from his position as commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java in Octo-
ber 1959 for demanding money from local businesses’ (Rieffel and Pramodharwardani,
2007, p 31).
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and military/police extortion differed only in that they were quite trans-
parent to the ‘taxpayer’.
The analogy with franchises in the world of commerce is useful for
understanding the way in which the Soeharto regime operated. It is
worth thinking carefully about such matters, because Soeharto deliv-
ered highly effective government – achieving rapid growth sustained
over some three decades – notwithstanding the corrupt and anti-demo-
cratic character of his regime. It is important to understand aspects of
the franchise that explain its success, and also to understand aspects of
the Soeharto legacy that now stand in the way of Indonesia’s economic
progress.
The basic characteristics of franchises in the business world include:
a contractual relationship between a franchisor and multiple franchisees;
payment of an entry fee by those wishing to join the franchise, together
with further regular payments to the franchisor in order to maintain
their membership; and delegation of management of local aspects of
the individual franchise operating unit to the franchisees. The key to
success is the franchisor, who has the right and responsibility to design
the products sold, and to determine the overall operating parameters
for the way they are delivered to customers. Thus, for example, every
Starbucks outlet looks much the same and sells much the same range
of products, wherever in the world it is located; likewise for Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, and so on.
In this case, the ‘product’ was the right to make use of the coercive
power of government to impose ‘private taxation’ on the general public,
whether by means of bureaucratic or conventional extortion, or by artifi-
cially boosting the profitability of insider firms at the expense of the
general public (and then sharing the excess profit harvest with the benefi-
ciary companies). The revenues collected were for the private benefit of
individual members of the franchise and of the ‘owner’ of the franchise,
Soeharto. In order to join the franchise or to move to a higher level within
it – for example, by being appointed as a provincial governor or district
head, or to a position of authority in one of the ministries, or to a court in
one of the main commercial centres, or to a management position in one
of the state enterprises – the individual was required to make a payment
in some form, directly or indirectly (through higher-level franchisees) to
the franchisor. This can best be considered as the upfront payment of a
share of revenues expected to be received in the future by virtue of the
exercise of the power to extort from individuals and firms, or to generate
and share in rents harvested by insider firms.
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The franchise concept elaborated here should be distinguished from
treatments of government in the public choice literature, a key advance
in which was to drop the implicit assumption that government bureau-
crats strove selflessly to promote the public good –assuming instead
that they, like everyone else, were motivated by self-interest (see, for
example, Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1974).
But this literature, very largely built up within the context of democ-
racy as practised in the USA, took for granted a free and fair electoral
system in which the government of the day was obliged by the threat of
being voted out of office to constrain the pursuit of bureaucratic self-
interest. The present paper replaces the implicit assumption of free and
fair elections with an assumption that the government itself – or, more
precisely, its leader – deliberately and successfully sets about acquir-
ing (and maintaining) a political monopoly. Whereas a large part of
this earlier literature focuses on ‘rent-seeking’, the emphasis here is on
‘rent generation and harvesting’.
By any measure, the Soeharto franchise was spectacularly success-
ful in its objective of generating wealth for its members and cronies.
Pre-crisis estimates of the net worth of the Soeharto family run to many
billions of dollars, while cronies such as Liem Sioe Liong became among
the richest individuals in Asia. Countless high-level bureaucrats, mili-
tary officials, state enterprise managers and judges became fabulously
wealthy relative to their miserably small official salaries. One of the
keys to success was the fact that the regime was able to maintain a very
high average annual rate of economic growth (well over 7% in real
terms) over some three decades; very few countries in the world are
able to boast a similar achievement. Of course, the regime collapsed in
fairly spectacular fashion in 1998, and the economy headed into a very
deep recession. But although economic output fell by 13% in that year,
conditions were able to be stabilized quite quickly after the regime
change, and by 2000 the economy had returned to growth at annual
rates of around 5%.
Even taking into account the major setback at the end of the 1990s,
Soeharto left Indonesia’s economy, and most of its people, consider-
ably better off than they had been when he first came to power,
notwithstanding the large-scale redistribution of income from the gen-
eral public to the elite. For example, anthropologists Irwan Abdullah
and Ben White describe the changes they observed between the early
1970s and the late 1990s in a village close to the provincial capital of
Yogyakarta, as follows (Abdullah and White, 2006, p 60):
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‘… many signs of material improvement were obvious. Improved
roads and a new bridge had cut the travel time to the city of Yogyakarta
by about 40% … The quality of housing was much improved; nearly
all houses have had access to electricity since the mid-1980s and
more than half of all households now have TV sets at home (there
was no TV or electricity in the village in 1972–1973). … rice yields
[were] about twice their former levels …’
Elsewhere, I have argued that the important distinction between Soeharto
and most other developing country dictators or regimes is that he had an
implicit understanding of the logic behind the so-called ‘Laffer curve’:
that maximizing tax revenue (whether public or private tax) involves
keeping the rate of taxation modest, since high tax rates have the effect of
encouraging tax avoidance and evasion, or even driving the taxed activity
out of existence (McLeod, 2000, pp 105–106). The Soeharto franchise
owed its success to its ability to impose private taxation at a relatively low
rate but on a very wide tax base – effectively involving the entire economy
and its supporting natural resources. The contrast with highly destructive
dictatorial regimes such as those in developing countries like Nigeria and
Zimbabwe, where private taxation was levied at high rates that took no
account of their longer-term implications, could not be more stark.
Since the effectiveness of any organization depends on the behav-
iour of the individuals that comprise it, Soeharto’s principal concern as
‘owner’ of the franchise was to create a set of incentives for individu-
als within it that would guarantee its success. An important concern of
this paper is to elaborate the nature of these incentives.
As is the case with commercial franchises in the world of business,
the basic incentive to high performance of franchisees is the monetary
return this brings. Individuals are willing to buy into the franchise if
they expect monetary rewards that would reflect a reasonable return on
this investment. As we have just noted, countless individuals were able
to achieve huge increases in their net worth during their working careers
by virtue of their success as franchisees. There have always been
numerous applicants for positions in the civil service and the military
relative to the number of such positions available at any time, and indi-
viduals have always been willing to make under-the-counter payments
to the relevant ‘gatekeepers’ to secure such positions, or to secure pro-
motions and transfers to more lucrative postings once inside the system.
Observations such as these are clearly indicative of the strong finan-
cial incentives facing New Order franchisees.
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Another similarity with ordinary business franchises was the exist-
ence of a process of ‘natural selection’ that contributed to overall success.
Individuals who buy into commercial franchises but find that they make
an inadequate return on their investment typically sell out to others
who think they can do better. Those who meet with greater success
tend to move to higher levels in the organization or to increase the
number of franchise outlets under their control. In the Soeharto fran-
chise, individual performance relative to the objectives of the franchise
was constantly monitored, and franchisees were continuously assigned
and reassigned to positions that reflected their performance. In other
words, the less successful franchisees found themselves shifted side-
ways as they were replaced by others willing to bid more for their
positions, or who had persuaded officials at higher levels that they were
capable of superior performance – and therefore of making greater finan-
cial and other contributions to the franchise – than those of the
incumbents.
On the other hand, Soeharto could not rely solely on positive mon-
etary incentives for the effectiveness of the franchise arrangements.
He also had to concern himself with the fact that by no means all in-
dividuals employed in the public sector would willingly or
enthusiastically abuse their positions for private gain at the expense
of the general public. The reality was that a significant proportion of
individuals who joined the public sector hoped for nothing more than
to be able to earn a reasonable day’s pay from an honest day’s work.
Not only would such people be averse to the idea of privately taxing
the general public for their own benefit, but many of them could be
expected to oppose the system and to expose others who actively sup-
ported its operations. Clearly, the franchise idea could not be
successful if individuals of high integrity were able to block, or seri-
ously disrupt, the processes that generated income redistribution in
favour of the elite. For this reason it was necessary to create a set of
negative incentives as well.
The judiciary as an example
A useful case study of this aspect of the Soeharto strategy can be found
in the history of the judiciary under the New Order, which has been
discussed in extraordinary and colourful detail by Sebastiaan Pompe
(2005). The following discussion relies heavily on this work. It is par-
ticularly apt to focus here on the judiciary, since independent courts
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would have represented an obvious conduit for challenges to the regime
based on the illegality of key aspects of its functioning.
The role of the judiciary during the Soeharto era was relatively mi-
nor. Indeed, the regime had virtually no real commitment to the rule of
law (notwithstanding abundant rhetoric to the contrary), and it is prob-
ably not too much of an exaggeration to suggest that, as with the trappings
of democracy, it maintained a judiciary primarily for cosmetic pur-
poses. Indonesian citizens and much of the world at large all took it as
read that every nation state should have a freely elected legislature and
a system of courts to ensure proper enforcement of the laws enacted by
that legislature. The constitution therefore required there to be a par-
liament and a judiciary, and so the regime had to take the existence of
these as a given, but its prime concern was to ensure that it controlled
membership of the parliament and that the courts would pose no threat
to itself or to its supporters. Thus, despite it being clearly stipulated in
law that the judiciary should not be subject to interference from any
outside party,8 in practice, Soeharto was able to make sure that it was
in fact thoroughly subservient to his regime.
First, he made sure that the supreme court did not have the right to
review the conformity of government legislation with the constitution,
thus ruling out any challenge from the judiciary itself regarding the
legal underpinnings of the regime’s policies. Second, he made sure
that personnel administration relating to the judiciary – that is, matters
relating to appointments, transfers and promotions of judges – was under
the control of the bureaucracy.9 Third, judges’ salaries were tied to
those in the civil service, which meant that they were kept to very low
levels relative to those for individuals with similar legal skills and ex-
perience in the private sector.
The net effect of these second and third aspects was totally to de-
stroy the independence of the judiciary – to ensure that it could be
relied upon to protect and further the interests of the franchise. Judges
could not earn an income commensurate with their professional status
if they relied entirely on the base salary plus formal allowances. To
achieve this, it became necessary for them to supplement their income
in some manner, and the only realistic option was to accept direct or
indirect ‘gifts’ from parties appearing in their courts. The best oppor-
tunities for generating a steady and substantial flow of such gifts were
8 Article 4 of Law 14/1970 on the Basic Principles of the Judiciary.
9 Article 31 of Law 14/1970 stipulated that judges were to be appointed and removed
from office by the President.
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to be found in the major commercial centres, especially Jakarta; by
contrast, any judge transferred to some small city in an outlying area
would have very little scope for supplementing his or her income. But
administrative authority over promotions and transfers was in the hands
of the executive, and implemented through the Department of Justice.
The implication was clear: judges either did what was expected of them
by the regime – including making the ‘right’ decisions in cases in which
the government had an interest, and making adequate financial contri-
butions to the franchise in return for appointment to lucrative positions
– or they would find themselves posted to a legal backwater where
their careers would shrivel away, forcing them to live in virtual pov-
erty relative to their professional status.
For a few years at the beginning of the New Order, there was a strug-
gle between the government and the judiciary in relation to all of these
matters, but the battle was eventually won decisively by the former
with the passage of Law 14/1970 on Basic Principles of the Judiciary.
As a result, the government was able thereafter to ensure a compliant
judiciary, to such an extent that for the next quarter of a century it
never lost a case in court.10
Given the fact of its existence by virtue of constitutional require-
ment, if nothing else, the role of the judiciary and the associated legal
bureaucracy was, to a considerable extent, simply to protect the fran-
chise against various kinds of challenge. Vocal critics of the regime
could be silenced by putting them in jail, for example. Well known
examples include labour activist Mochtar Pakpahan (sentenced to four
years’ imprisonment for engineering a strike in Medan in 1994), politi-
cal maverick Sri Bintang Pamungkas (sentenced to nearly three years’
imprisonment in 1996 for insulting the head of state, and sued in 1997
for subversion for setting up a new political party and calling for
Soeharto’s resignation), and student leader Budiman Sudjatmiko (sen-
tenced to 13 years in prison for publishing a political tract criticizing
the government in 1997) (Pompe, 2005, pp 164–171). Likewise, the
courts could be used to help suppress, rather than protect, the freedom
of expression supposedly guaranteed by the Press Law. The most noto-
rious example is that of the highly respected weekly, Tempo, which
had its publication permit withdrawn in 1994. Although it won its chal-
lenge to this action in the district court, before long the government
successfully appealed this decision in the supreme court (Steele, 2005).
10 More precisely: it did lose a few cases in the district courts and even occasionally in
the supreme court, but was always able to have these decisions overturned on appeal.
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Broadly speaking, the state could more or less do what it wanted
with its citizens without having to fear that the judiciary would find
against it in any case brought to the courts. The extent to which judges,
the courts and the police did provide basic law enforcement services
for the benefit of the general public was minimal. Just as petty bureau-
crats needed some form of inducement to certify compliance with a
regulation, so bribes were usually needed to get the police even to at-
tend the scene of a crime, or to obtain a favourable judgment in court.
Indonesia’s citizens never really thought of themselves or their prop-
erty as being well protected by any part of the law enforcement apparatus
under the New Order. But both the judiciary and the military could
certainly be relied on to protect the integrity of the franchise itself, the
former using the mechanisms of the court, and the latter relying simply
on violence or the threat of violence.
It is all too easy to condemn individual judges for allowing them-
selves to become involved in corrupt activity and to be used as an
instrument of oppression by the regime, as they had been placed in an
almost impossible position. The older generation, at least, had invested
several years in studying the law and preparing themselves for a life-
time career in the judiciary, but when the time came, they found that it
was practically impossible to apply the law with integrity: the fran-
chise system simply did not allow them to do so.
Of course, any judge could have made a protest against the regime
by finding for the plaintiff in some case in which the government or
one of its supporters was on the opposing side. But any such decision
would inevitably be overturned on appeal to a higher court, and the
judge in question would find his or her career in ruins. That said, the
argument that it was impossible to fight against the system provided a
convenient justification for those judges who eagerly embraced the
opportunity to enrich themselves corruptly – especially younger ones
who had taken on this career when the nature of the system had already
become obvious. In any case, the point of this essay is not to pass
judgment on judges, but simply to illustrate the nature of the system in
operation – and, by implication, to point out the kinds of changes to
managing the judicial system that are necessary if corruption is to be
minimized and the quality of judicial decisions significantly improved.
The history of the judiciary under the New Order clearly illustrates
the key features of the Soeharto strategy for ensuring that most mem-
bers of the franchise institutions would support the franchise, and that
few would oppose it. Setting judicial salaries at or near comparable
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market rates would have been counterproductive. First, it would have
increased the amount of legitimate taxation revenue required, thus re-
ducing the scope of the franchise for generating private tax revenue.
More importantly, it would have put judges in a position where they
could act against the regime in court cases brought against the govern-
ment, without having to forego a standard of living appropriate for
individuals of their professional status. Conversely, the imposition of
very low salaries relative to comparable private sector levels ensured
that judges would be forced to play by the rules of the franchise, or else
to leave the judiciary, if they were to enjoy such a standard of living.
The consequences for members of the judiciary varied widely. Those
who were unwilling to do the bidding of the regime found themselves
languishing indefinitely in far distant outposts, with few fringe ben-
efits, little work to occupy their time or hone their skills, and no hope
for a ‘successful’ career in any sense of the term. At the other end of
the spectrum, those who, like the president, enthusiastically embraced
the notion of taking advantage of their positions to achieve personal
enrichment, were only too willing to do what was asked of them by the
regime. Among the latter, those who were most effective were appointed
to highly lucrative positions in the most active big city district courts,
and some were promoted to the high courts or the supreme court.
Public sector civilian employees as threats to the regime
With this brief case study of the judiciary – technically part of the
bureaucracy during the New Order – as background, we turn now to
discuss in some detail the application of broadly the same kind of strat-
egy to the bureaucracy as a whole. It would be unrealistic to suggest
that the bulk of individuals employed in the bureaucracy when Soeharto
came to office and who joined it subsequently intended to sacrifice
their own interests in the service of their fellow citizens. No doubt
many of them entered the bureaucracy (and other parts of the public
sector) for the same reason that others took up private sector employ-
ment: simply to earn a living. It can safely be assumed, however, that
many of these individuals and other potential entrants would have been
appalled by the notion of government as an instrument for redistribut-
ing income to the elite. One of the key problems Soeharto faced,
therefore, as argued above, was to ensure that civil service bureaucrats
would at least acquiesce in the face of common knowledge as to what
the franchise was about, and certainly not actively oppose it.
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An important characteristic of New Order strategy was that public
sector institutions typically were not provided with sufficient funding
from the budget to enable them to do much more than pay the salaries
to which their employees were formally entitled. In turn, formal salary
entitlements, especially for higher-level personnel, were set well be-
low comparable levels in the private sector. The practical implication
was that managers of these institutions had to find additional, off-budget
sources of funds if they were to get things done and to provide addi-
tional allowances for their employees in order to secure their loyalty.
Inevitably, this would involve engagement in various forms of activity
that were either clearly corrupt, or at least were located within the fuzzy
boundary that delimits corrupt and non-corrupt activity. Soeharto was
very familiar with such circumstances from his days as an army com-
mander, and could see the obvious advantages of continuing these kinds
of arrangements. Thus, for example, despite the importance of the mili-
tary’s contribution to maintaining Soeharto’s political monopoly, on
which the success of the franchise depended,
‘the military won little in the way of budget resources during the
Soeharto era. … By withholding budget funds, [Soeharto] gave mili-
tary commanders a strong incentive to engage in income-generating
activities. At the same time, his ability to grant or deny access to these
activities fostered a high degree of loyalty and dependence among these
commanders.’ (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007, p 32)
In other words, Soeharto secured the loyalty of the military not so much
by allocating government revenue to it, but by appointing its commanders
as franchisees – by granting them the right to collect private tax rev-
enues and to allocate them as they saw fit, including to their own pockets.
The similarity with the case of the judiciary discussed above is obvi-
ous.
Within the bureaucracy, management would ordinarily devote part
of the so-called ‘development’ budget, largely deriving from bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies, to the payment of various allowances –
for example, to people who served on project committees (and, through
them, to both their superiors and subordinates in the same area). This
might seem like a clear case of misuse of government funds, since it
amounted to people being paid extra simply for doing their jobs, but it
must be remembered that the formal salaries of those same individuals
were set well below comparable private sector salaries. In other words,
to some extent this common practice simply brought overall remunera-
tion up to fair (market) levels. Thus, the familiar argument that civil
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servants were and are ‘forced’ to engage in corrupt activity has some
truth in it, but should not be taken too far. It is one thing to accept
routine cash supplements that merely bring total remuneration up to
market levels without asking too much about their provenance. It is
another thing altogether to set about abusing one’s position in order to
become fabulously wealthy, out of all proportion to any reasonable
return on one’s skills and experience.
More obviously corrupt was the practice of awarding government
contracts at inflated prices to firms that agreed to kick back a suitably
large portion of the excess over reasonable market value to the offi-
cials or committees that awarded the contracts. These illicit payments
were typically also used as slush funds for topping up the incomes of
other employees of the government entity in question, although pre-
sumably the officials directly involved in negotiations would have taken
a disproportionately large share. As mentioned earlier, this kind of ac-
tivity amounted to reproduction on a small scale of the arrangements
by which the franchise generated rents for conglomerates associated
with the leadership of the regime and shared in those rents. The key
point to note, however, is that the rents were shared widely within the
relevant part of the bureaucracy. In this manner, large numbers of offi-
cials, especially those at the higher levels where formal salaries were
very low relative to market levels and compensating allowances were
correspondingly high, became dependent on the continued operation
of the system. It was highly unlikely that any individual would blow
the whistle on such practices, because to do so would be to put at risk
not only a significant part of one’s own overall income, but also that of
one’s peers. As with the judiciary, lack of transparency within the sys-
tem for transfers and promotions meant that such individuals could be
severely punished by denying them promotion and access to informal
allowances in cash and in kind to which there was no formal entitle-
ment, or moving them to bureaucratic backwaters.
A key part of the solution to the problem of ensuring loyalty to the
franchise can be seen in the public sector approach to determining the
structure of employee remuneration (including basic salaries plus a wide
range of formal allowances).11 If these had been set at levels compar-
able with those in the private sector, the public sector could have been
staffed perfectly adequately for the purpose of undertaking what are
11 For earlier discussions of the nature, structure and consequences of public sector
employee remuneration, see, for example, Smith (1975); Gray (1979); and Clark and
Oey-Gardiner (1991).
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commonly regarded as the legitimate responsibilities of government.
However, this would surely have resulted in the recruitment of large
numbers of individuals who would have baulked at the abuse of the
powers of government that characterized the Soeharto regime. The fran-
chise could hardly have been successful under such conditions. Instead,
the approach was to impose a salary structure that provided market-
comparable salaries at the lower levels of the civil service (where
opportunities for supplementing one’s income were very limited), but
which kept salaries increasingly far below those for similarly qualified
and experienced individuals in the private sector at the higher levels
(where such opportunities were widespread). Thus the formal salary
structure was greatly compressed: ratios of high-level to low-level sala-
ries were much smaller than in large private sector organizations.
At first glance, this would appear to have made a career in the civil
service thoroughly unattractive, except perhaps for those who did not
aspire to promotions significantly beyond the lower ranks; and yet it
was always the case that there were far more applicants for public sec-
tor positions than there were jobs available.12 To some extent, this could
be explained by applicants having unrealistic perceptions as to the pos-
sibility of being recruited despite their limited educational achievements.
The prospect of lifetime employment, a government pension beyond
that, plus various other benefits such as subsidized family access to
health services, free transport to the place of work and so on, was also
important. More important, however, was the widespread and well
founded perception that the income-earning potential of positions in
the public sector was far greater than the formal salary structure sug-
gested. In other words, it was well known that one could expect to
receive a wide range of additional allowances of one kind or another,
and that if one were so inclined there would be ample opportunity to be
involved in lucrative corrupt activity.
In short, the kind of salary structure chosen for public sector institu-
tions was such as to discourage the entry of highly principled individuals
(which is not to deny that many such were recruited, nevertheless), and
correspondingly to encourage that of people who at least would not
12 In her study of central Sumba, for example, Vel (2008) argues that ‘the state is asso-
ciated in a rather vague way with general opportunities for upward mobility, and
more concretely imagined as a vast complex of secure employment and additional
material benefits. The state is imagined as a rewarding patron, the gatekeeper to a
more prosperous life and a secure employer. … Sumbanese want to become part of
this complex.’
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concern themselves too greatly about the sources of their special al-
lowances or, better still, of those predisposed to engage actively in the
work of the franchise. This is the only plausible explanation for the
fact that individuals were willing to pay for the privilege of embarking
on, and persevering with, a career characterized by increasingly large
shortfalls below market salary levels the higher one rose in the hierarchy.
Decisions had to be made not only about the public sector salary
structure, but also about the number of employees. Indonesia’s civil
service under Soeharto was never particularly large,13 and yet, in rela-
tion to the fairly narrow objectives of the franchise, the number of
public sector employees seems at first glance to have been unnecessar-
ily great. This impression is no doubt heavily influenced by the obvious
degree of underemployment within the bureaucracy, which was quickly
apparent to visitors to virtually any government office building.
Early in the New Order, Soeharto decided to adopt personnel man-
agement practices within the bureaucracy that mirrored those he had
been used to in the army. One aspect of this was a rigid pyramidal
hierarchy, in which the commanding officer would have a fixed number
of subordinates reporting to him, each of whom would have a fixed
number reporting to him, and so on down to the level of private. Thus
all battalions, all regiments and so on would have the same number of
individuals at each level in the hierarchy. Whatever its merits in the
military context, such an approach made little sense within the bu-
reaucracy, because different agencies were involved in widely varying
activities, and their staffing needs differed correspondingly (Synner-
strom, 2007, pp 164–165). There was no reason why we would expect
the staffing needs of, say, the Department of Public Works to match
those of the Department of Education. Nevertheless, the benefit to the
franchise was that this approach typically resulted in excessive num-
bers of bureaucrats at low levels and insufficient numbers of them at
high levels. The rampant underemployment of staff just mentioned was
in fact a characteristic only of low-level employees; by contrast, those
at high levels were quite often heavily overworked. The implication
was that relatively few at the low levels could expect rapid promotion,
and yet promotion was the only way to gain access to the more lucra-
tive opportunities for supplementing one’s income with special
allowances paid from the slush funds or through participation in corrupt
13 In 1997 (Soeharto’s last year in office), Indonesia had 4.1 million civil servants,
equivalent to just 2% of the population.
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activity. In these circumstances, individuals desirous of promotion had
strong incentives to compete with their peers – especially for promo-
tion into positions in the ‘wet’ areas, where the availability of off-budget
funds was greatest.
Such competition took a variety of forms, and working hard was by
no means the only one. The process for determining promotions and
transfers within the bureaucracy lacked transparency and objectivity,
and relations with one’s own superior were, in practice, the crucially
important deciding factor – hence the prevalent culture of asal bapak
senang – ‘as long as the boss is happy’ – within the Indonesian bu-
reaucracy. Recall that management of franchises at the local level is
typically delegated to the franchisee, who is then more or less free to
choose which of his subordinates to promote or transfer to positions of
greater authority and which to leave where they are or to shift to posi-
tions of little influence. In the context of the franchise, in which the
primary objective was regressive redistribution of the national income
rather than the delivery of services to the public, it is hardly surprising
that competition also often took the form of bidding for desirable posi-
tions.
‘In Indonesia, most civil service positions are for sale, rather than
being acquired in open competition based on merit. The practice of
selling civil service jobs goes hand in hand with corruption more
generally – from one per-spective, the investment needed to obtain a
position needs to be recov-ered; from another, the likelihood of ac-
cess to lucrative opportunities for self-enrichment makes such an
investment worthwhile.’ (Synnerstrom, 2007, p 174)
The winners of the competition were those who bid the highest prices
to those who determined who would be promoted or appointed to par-
ticular positions, and these were typically those who had the greatest
confidence in their ability to abuse these prospective positions of au-
thority to generate cash inflows. That is, just as the salary structure
encouraged recruitment of the kinds of individuals who would serve
the franchise well, so the hierarchical structure within the bureaucracy
reinforced this tendency by encouraging the promotion of the same
kinds of individuals after they had had a chance to demonstrate to their
superiors and to themselves their capacity and willingness to contrib-
ute to the objectives of the franchise.
There was perhaps one additional reason for recruiting what may
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seem like excessive numbers of high school and university graduates
to the public sector.14 The regime had decided to increase significantly
the number of children and young people attending schools and uni-
versities, since this was clearly a way of generating support from the
public and thus offsetting concerns that the government cared only about
its big business friends. But students have always been quite a potent
political force in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2005, chapter 5), so it made sense
to hold out the enticing prospect of a well remunerated career in the
civil service following graduation, because students – and their par-
ents – would have been well aware that involvement in student activism
directed against the regime would very likely ruin any chance of being
recruited. The strategy of offering eventual access to lucrative posi-
tions in the franchise to those who demonstrated their willingness to
accept it for what it was, thus extended even to potential public sector
employees.
Allowing members of the public sector branches of the franchise to
tap into foreign aid flows and to collude with private sector firms en-
gaged in economic transactions with the public sector constituted useful
and effective means of allowing public sector employees to top up their
formal remuneration and thus to ensure their support for the broad ob-
jectives of the franchise. But there were, of course, additional means of
doing this. Recall here the distinction introduced earlier between in-
siders and outsiders. The insiders were the privileged firms that
cooperated with the franchise so as indirectly to tax those outside the
elite in one way or another. The outsider firms and individuals, on the
other hand, were the targets rather than the beneficiaries of such taxa-
tion, and they were taxed by way of bureaucratic extortion. Broadly
speaking, the bureaucracy created a wide range of regulations with
which firms needed to comply, and then found ways of forcing firms to
pay bribes in order to obtain certification of such compliance. In addi-
tion, it accepted bribes from firms wishing to reduce, or avoid altogether,
their payments of legitimate taxes, such as customs duties, value added
tax and income tax.15
14 In 1997, 83% of civil servants were graduates of senior high school or tertiary insti-
tutions.
15 Outsider firms and individuals were also subject to extortion by the military/police,
involving the employment of violence or the threat of violence to persuade them to
contribute to their own ‘protection’. The small but relatively wealthy ethnic Chinese
community was always particularly vulnerable, and some of its members found it
prudent to try to keep local military officials favourably disposed to it (Susanto,
2006). But indigenous [pribumi] citizens were also targets.
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It is because of the heavy emphasis on public sector extortion from
firms and individuals that Indonesia has such a poor image in relation
to corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2006; World Bank, 2006; see further discussion below).
Indonesia’s rapid economic progress under Soeharto is somewhat para-
doxical when viewed against this background. The paradox is readily
resolved, however, when we recall the existence of insider firms, which
collectively accounted for a very large share of the modern sector of
the economy, and which were not only broadly immune to such extor-
tion but in fact benefited strongly from their privileged relationship
with the bureaucracy, the state enterprises and the public sector in gen-
eral.
Post-Soeharto reform
The Asian financial crisis that began in mid-1997 suddenly created
turmoil in Indonesia, depriving the New Order regime of its legitimacy
as a sound economic manager. In turn, this simultaneously embold-
ened opponents of the regime and dramatically weakened Soeharto’s
ability to maintain discipline within the franchise, such that its various
branches and members no longer continued to act in a mutually sup-
portive fashion. As a result, he was pushed out of office in May 1998,
and reformers moved very quickly to overturn several key features of
the regime he had built up over the previous three decades. Relatively
little progress has been made in reforming the bureaucracy, however,
which remains highly dysfunctional.
There can be no doubt that the bureaucracy inherited by President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and the three previous post-Soeharto
presidents is highly corrupt. Surveys such as those undertaken by Trans-
parency International suggest that Indonesia is one of the most corrupt
countries in the world (ranked at equal 130th out of 163 countries in
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2006).16
Other sources, such as the World Bank’s Governance Matters and Do-
ing Business reports (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006; World
Bank, 2006) show clearly that it is also very inefficient, and emphasize
the deleterious impact of this inefficiency on the business and invest-
ment environment. For example, Indonesia was ranked only in the 37th
percentile in terms of ‘government effectiveness’ in the 2005 Governance
16 See Website: http://www.transparency.org. On this index, the closer the numerical
ranking to 1, the less severe the perceived problem of corruption.
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Table 1. Ease of doing business in Indonesia: selected sub-indices and
components.
Indicator Measure Rank (among 155 countries)
Overall ease of doing business  115
Starting a business  144
Time 151 days 149
Cost (% of income per capita) 101.7% 121
Hiring and firing workers  120
Difficulty of Hiring Index (0–100) 61 122
Rigidity of Hours Index (0–100) 40 63
Difficulty of Firing Index (0–100) 70 131
Hiring cost (% of salary) 10.2% 53
Firing costs (weeks of wages) 144.8 weeks 150
Paying taxes  118
Time 560 hours 119
Registering property  107
Time 42 days 60
Cost (% of property value) 11.0% 126
Dealing with licences  107
Time 224 days 98
Cost (% of income per capita) 364.9% 104
Source: World Bank, 2006.
Note: The closer the numerical rank to 1, the easier it is perceived to do business.
Matters report.17 At the same time, its world ranking on a number of
important standardized indicators of the ease of doing business (as this
relates to the influence of the bureaucracy) can also be seen to be very
low (Table 1). Indeed, the government itself is well aware of the prob-
lem, and has been at pains to proclaim the seriousness with which it is
trying to deal with it; yet it seems to have no clue as to why the bu-
reaucracy is both corrupt and inefficient – implicitly putting the blame
on human failings (which must largely be taken as a given) rather than
the design of existing institutional arrangements.
The bureaucracy succeeded in generating consistently high economic
growth during the New Order period because this was in the interests
of the franchise, and because there were strong incentives for success
within it. The franchise prospered by taxing virtually the entire economy,
so the faster the economy grew, the greater the pay-off. But in the en-
tirely different context of post-Soeharto democratic Indonesia, the
bureaucracy as economic policy maker has been found wanting. The
franchise no longer exists, since there is no longer a franchisor capable
17 On this index, the lower the percentile rank, the less effective government is per-
ceived to be.
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of imposing discipline on all of its branches: this became an impossi-
bility once Soeharto’s monopoly on the presidency was removed. Its
collapse following Soeharto’s demise is very closely analogous to the
breakdown of a cartel as a result of its individual members’ failure to
restrict their output to agreed quotas: cartels cannot survive in the absence
of internal discipline. Individuals still have an incentive to abuse their
authority to their own advantage, but they now do so in uncoordinated
fashion, competing with each other rather than playing defined, mutu-
ally supportive roles within the giant organism that is the Indonesian
public sector.
The previous strategy of promoting civil servants on the basis of
their loyalty and usefulness to the franchise, rather than their ability to
discern what constituted sound policy, has left the bureaucracy very
short of the skills and competence needed in most if not all fields, in-
cluding economics. There are large numbers of bureaucrats in the
economic ministries and the central bank in a position to influence
economic policy, the majority of whom appear to favour intervention-
ist approaches rather than simply allowing market forces and private
sector firms largely to determine the process of economic growth.
Two factors drive this interventionism. First, bureaucrats inherited
by post-Soeharto governments are well aware from past experience
how intervention in markets can be used to extort money from the pri-
vate sector. Thus, for example, it came as no surprise when the new
Investment Law (Law 25/2007) failed to recast the Investment Coordi-
nation Board (BKPM) as an investment promotion agency rather than
an investment regulating agency as it always had been during the New
Order (Manning and Roesad, 2006, p 158). In this and countless other
areas, the desirable direction of reform involves rolling back govern-
ment controls in order to deprive the bureaucracy of its power to extort
from the private sector, but this, of course, runs directly counter to the
personal interests of the officials who administer them.
The proclivity for interventionism is often driven by genuine con-
viction rather than being purely self-serving, however. The second major
underlying factor is that many bureaucrats involved with economic policy
making have inadequate – if any – professional economics training.18
Interest groups throughout the economy find useful allies among such
policy makers, who lack the analytical skills to be able to distinguish
18 Many ‘economist’ bureaucrats actually specialized in the related areas of account-
ancy and business management, rather than economics itself, when undertaking their
degrees.
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the interests of these groups from those of the general public. Indone-
sia is no different from other countries in this respect, of course.
The list of interventionist policies favoured by such policy makers is
so long that it is not practical to mention them all here – much less
analyse their distributional and efficiency consequences in detail – but
it includes the following: special tax treatment to encourage particular
kinds of manufacturing; price supports and subsidized inputs for farm-
ers; protection of domestic firms from import competition (a policy
that is now frequently found at the regional level as well as nationally);
provision of subsidized loans for small businesses; regulation of work-
ers’ wages and other entitlements; opposition to the divestment of
majority shares of state firms to private sector entities; and bureau-
cratic planning rather than reliance on markets to determine the directions
of structural change in the economy and in particular sectors. In each
case, it is not difficult to mount a strong argument that the gains to
those who benefit from intervention are outweighed by aggregate losses
to the general public, although this would take us well beyond the scope
of this paper.
In short, the bureaucracy often lacks a clear idea of what constitutes
sound economic policy;19 and even when the broad thrust of its poli-
cies is more firmly based, it often proves incapable of implementation.20
The Soeharto legacy in terms of the bureaucracy is therefore not sim-
ply an ingrained culture of corruption, but also a pervasive lack of the
skills necessary to manage such a large and complex economy as Indo-
nesia’s.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to show how the Soeharto regime man-
aged the economy and polity of Indonesia for the benefit of the dominant
elite, rather than for Indonesian citizens in general. I have argued that
his franchise was extraordinarily successful in terms of its own objec-
tives, and that this reflected the strategies employed to provide
appropriate incentives to individuals within the several public sector
19 For example, in McLeod (2005), I discuss the potentially disastrous implications of
creation of the new Deposit Guarantee Institution, which seems to indicate that policy
makers in the Ministry of Finance and the central bank have learned little from the
meltdown of the banking system in 1998.
20 The inability to formulate the kinds of policies needed if the government is to suc-
ceed in its aim of involving the private sector in the provision of infrastructure is an
obvious case in point (McLeod, 2005, pp 144–146).
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branches of his franchise. Soeharto set the formal salaries of his
franchisees low relative to market levels, and kept the operating budg-
ets for most government entities small relative to their costs. At the
same time, however, the franchisees were effectively granted the right
to collect private taxation, backed by the full powers of the franchise.
Positions as franchisees were thus eagerly sought after by those who
had no qualms about using the coercive power of government for their
personal benefit. Others who wanted nothing more than fair – that is,
market-comparable – remuneration were obliged to suppress their moral
concerns about the functioning of the franchise unless they were pre-
pared to be left to languish in positions where they would have no real
influence on the processes of government, and where their earnings
would be far below a reasonable level for individuals of their profes-
sional status. The inadequacy of salaries and budgets forced franchisees
to find ways to supplement the funds at their disposal, inevitably draw-
ing them towards corrupt activity – thus making them dependent on,
and unlikely to challenge, the status quo. Paradoxically, inadequate
budgets and low salaries enabled Soeharto to buy support for the cor-
rupt practices of his franchise.
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